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The Growing Share of Services in
the U.S. Economy Degeneration
or Evolution?
Mack Ott
Surely the American people are not willing to become merely a service economy.
The American character is as much built around the sinews and muscle ofthe
factory line as the white-collar office.’
— Editorial, Christian Science Monitor
ince World War II, the production of services as a
share of U.S. real gross national product (GNP( has
risen from 58 percent to 68 percent. The concomitant
shift in the distribution of the labor force has been
much larger: about half of U.S. workers were em-
ployed in service industries in 1948; this proportion
had increased to nearly three-fourths by 1985. These
momentous changes have given rise to fears that the
United States is fast becoming a nation of people who
are “serving each other hamburgers or taking in each
other’s laundry.”
Theirony in this view is that it embodies aprofound
misinterpretation of U.S. economic history, both re-
cent and long-term. It has been the strength, rather
than the weakness, of the manufacturing sector that
has precipitated the shifts in employment and output
toward services. Put simply, high productivity growth
in manufacturing and agriculture and the long-term
Mack Ott is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bankof St.
Louis. James C. Poletti provided research assistance.
‘See Christian Science Monitor (1987).
‘Murray (1987). Of course, many economists and commentators
have countered this simplistic characterization of rising service
employment and output;for example, see Browne (1986), Krugman
and Hatsopoulos (1987), Mcusic (1987), Shelp and Hart (1986),
Tatom (1986, 1987) and Seaberry (1987). The phrase has become
soidiomaticthat Browne used it as the title of an article debunking its
thrust. She points out that the share of employment in the narrow
service sector (“other services” in this article) hasbeen rising faster
than manufacturing for some time.
effects of American investment in education have
made the faster growth of the service sector possible.
These forces have persisted not just since World War
II, but for a century or more. Similat- trends in output
and labor characterize the last century of economic
history in othet- industrial nations as well.
The purpose of this article is to document these
long-mn trends and to highlight some of the forces
driving them. The conclusion from this overview is
that, far from indicating a decline in the U.S. economic
outlook, the rising share of services reflects the in-
creasing productivity and well-being of workers, both
inside and outside ofU.S. factories and mills.
OUTPUT, LABORAND CAPITAL
EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES SINCE 1948:A BRIEFREVIEW
During the postwar era, output of the U.S. economy
as measured by real GNP has more than tripled, from
$1.1 trillion (in 1982 dollars) in 1948 to $3.7 trillion in
1986. Meanwhile, civilian employment nearly dou-
bled, from 58.3 million to 109.6 million. Since the
economy has been growing, analysis is greatly facili-
tated by considering proportional shares rather than
levels of output and labor. Chart I shows that, while
the services share of output has risen and, conse-
quently, thecommodities sharehas fallen, the share of
real GNP in manufacturing output has remained virtu-
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Chart 1
Distribution of Real GNP
1948—1985
ally unchanged at roughly 21 percent.3Consequently,
the widespread perception of U.S. deindustrialization
is puzzling.
In 1948, 31.4 million Americans were gainfully em-
ployed in seMce industries and 26.9 million in com-
modities production. Service sector employment
since then has grown apace with total employment,
rising to 83.2 million in 1985. Concurrently, employ-
‘Thecommoditiessector includes agriculture, manufacturing, mining
and construction industries; agriculture, in turn, includes forestry
and fishing. The services sector includes transportation, communi-
cations, utilities, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, and other
services industries; finance includes banking, thrift, finance and real
estate, and other services includes personal services, business
services,auto repair, healthservices, legal services and miscellane-
ous professional services. To mitigate the unavoidable confusion
between the services sector and its other services subsector, the
subsector will be referred to as other services unless the context
makes this unnecessary.
ment in the commodity sectorhas grown much more
slowly. In particular, agricultural employment de-
clined by over half, from 6.6 million workers to 3.0
million, mining fluctuated around 1.1 million, con-
stmction varied between 3 million and 5 million, and
manufacturing grew from 16 million to a peak of 20.9
million in 1979, then declined to around 19.2 million
in 1985.
As a result ofits faster growth, the share of employ-
ment in the services sector has risen during the four
postwar decades, from about 54 percent in 1948 to 72
percent in 1985. As table I shows, the postwar rise in
the share of labor IL) in services and its fall in com-
modities has been persistent andgeneral across sub-
sectors. Among the service subsectors, other services
rose from a 13.2 to a 23.2 percent employment share;
government employment rose from 11.7 to 18.3 per-
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doubled, from 3.2 to 6.2 percent. Only transportation
declined appreciably as railroads lost their domi-
nance in freight and passenger markets to trucking
and airline firms.
In commodities production, the share of labor in
agriculture fell from 11.4 percentin 1948 to 2.9 percent
in 1985, and mining’s share halved, from 1.8 to 0.9
percent. Manufacturing employment, rising in abso-
lute terms until 1979, fell persistently throughout the
period inshate terms, from 27.4 to 18.7 percent. Only
construction had the same employment share, 5.7
percent in 1985 as in 1948.
Table 1 also delineates the shifting capital (K) and
output IV) shares in the postwar U.S. economy. As was
shown in chart 1, the commodities output share de-
clined from 41.2 percent to 32.4 percent, but the de-
clinewas virtually all in agriculture, mining and con-
struction. in services, the distribution of rising output
shares during 1948—85 was quite diverse: Communi-
cations and utilities shares doubled and tripled, re-
spectively, and financial services had the largest share
increase — 5 percentage points — while government
services and transportation had declining shares.
Thedecline in thetransportation output share from
1948 (6.8 percent) to 1985 (3.5 percent) made the shift
in the capital from commodities to services smaller
than it otherwise would havebeen. As the railroad’s
share of transportation output fell from 1948 to 1985,
therewas a substitution ofpublic for private capital in
the transportation sector. The privately owned rail-
road capital stock — equipment and rights-of-way —
was supplanted not only by privately owned trucks
and aircraftbut also by the publicly owned highways,
airports and air control netwoi-ks used by trucking
companies and airlines.’ Iftransportation capital were
excluded from table 1, the change in the distribution
of the capital stock from 1948 to 1985 would reveal a
much greater rise inthe service sector’s capital share:
from 44.5 percent in 1948 to 70.1 percent in 1985.
In sum, the postwar shift of the U.S. economy to-
ward services has been pervasive: all sectors of ser-
‘Therisingshare of capital in the truck and aircarrier sectors has not
been commensurate with their rising proportion of transport ser-
vices. In 1948, the railroads accounted for about one-fifth of the
entire U.S. capital stock, but by 1985, this share had shrunk to less
than one-thirtieth. In terms of the transportation sector’s capital
stock, the railroad share fell from 78 percent in 1948 to 37 percent in
1985. Over this same period, the share of transportation output in
GNP (1982 $) from railroads fell from 38 percent to just over 17
percent, whilethe share oftruck and air carriersrose from 14.5 to 60
percent. Yet, the share ot transportation capital in the truck and air
carrier industries rose from about 7 to 36 percent, a much smaller
increase than the decrease in the railroad capital stock,
vices otherthan transportation and government have
become proportionally larger and more capital-
intensive.Thus, while it maybe provocative to speak of
the rising share of services as being produced by
short-order cooks and laundry workers, it is grossly
inaccurate (see opposite page): As illustrated in the
postwar breakdown of the other services subsector,
the service activities which have grown fastest since
1948 have been those in which capital investment —
both in human skills and in physical equipment —
have been substantial. More important, the shift to-
ward services, did not commence in the 1970s, but
characterizes the entire postwar era, and reflects a
substantive shift inthe occupational characteristics of
the U.S. labor force as well.
WHY HAS THE SERVICE SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT SHARE RISEN SINCE
1948?
There are two fundamentally interrelated reasons
forthe risein the service sector’s share of employment
in the postwarera:slower growth in laborproductivity
and faster growth in the demand for services.’
Slower Productivity Growth in Services
Labor productivity is measured by the ratio of out-
put per hour of labor input (V/Il). As table 2 shows,
overall labor productivity in the U.S. economy rose at
an average rateof1.8 percent peryear, from $11.23 per
hour (in 1982 dollars) in 1948 to $21.66 per hour in
1985.6 Productivity growth was much slower in the
‘The relatively rapid productivity growth in manufacturing has been
widely documented as an explanation for the declining labor input;
seefor example, Tatom (1986,1987), McUsic (1986) and Krugman
and Hatsopoulos (1986). The OECD’s ongoing estimation of Pur-
chasing PowerParity also provides support for optimists about the
/eve/ of U.S. productivity. Real GDP per capita for the United States
in 1986 is 41 percent greater thanfor Japan and 33 percent larger
than for Germany. These ratios are essentially unchanged from
1985; see 615 (1987).
‘Whenproductivityis measured on a per worker basis, the results are
even more divergent than the per hour basis shown in table 2 —
1 .85 percent annual growth rate overall with 2.32 percent in com-
modities vs. 1.47 percent in noncommodities; however, the per
worker datainclude self-employed, while the hourly data in table 2
do not. By reporting on a per hour basis, the distortion due to the
divergent patterns of hours per week in different sectors are
avoided, but at thecost of omitting data on entrepreneurs, proprie-
tors and especially farmers who are the most important class of
owner-operators (Indeed, the agriculture sector data underlying
table 2 implyhalf-time employment throughout the 1948—85 period
—929 annual hours in 1948 and 1,068 in 1985.). When agriculture’s
productivity is measured per worker (including the self-employed
owners), its growth rate during 1~48—85is 3.33 percent compared
to the table 2 figure of 2.95 percent.
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service sector (1.6 percent per year) than in the com-
modity sector (2.0 percent per year).
The slower productivity growth in services was not
at all uniform acrossits subsectors. Laborproductivity
growth in communications (COM) was thefastest ofall
subsectors, and it was nearly as fast in utilities (UTIL).
At the same time, wholesale trade (WHO) labor pro-
ductivitygrewfasterthan the average rate of the com-
modity industries. Yet, as noted earlier, the employ-
ment shares in these service categories did not rise
appreciably during the postwar era. The subsectors
that accounted for virtually the entire increase in the
service employment shares — other services, retail
trade and finance — had average annual productivity
growth rates of only about 1 percent.
Perhaps some of this slower productivity growth
resulted from theshorter averageworkyear in services
(measured in hours), implying a large component of
part-time employment. In 1985, the average hours per
employee in commodities, 1,783 hours, was nearly
three weeks longer than the average in noncommodi-
ties, 1,672 hours; moreover, in the service sector an-
nual hours varied considerably. For example, com-
munications and utilities workers averaged 1,986 and
1,936hours in 1985, roughlythe same as theaverage in
manufacturing, 1,942 hours; in contrast the other ser-
vices, finance and retail sectors each had average
employee hours of less than 1,670 hours. Conversely,
construction (1,575 hours) and agriculture (1,068
hours) also had low annual hours. Both industries are
seasonal and susceptible to the vagaries of weather,
but construction has had negative productivity
growth while agriculture’s productivity growth has
beenvery high.Thus, low hours in and of themselfdo
not provide an explanation for slow productivity
growth.
Bising labor productivity results from either an in-
crease in theproficiency ofworkers—an increase in
human capital — or an increase in plant and equip-
ment — nonhuman capital.~ Focusingfor the moment
‘Theodore W. Shultz is the economist most influential in developing
the notion of “human capital” forthe reservoir of skills, proficiencies
and knowleoge, for which he was awarded the 1979 Nobel Prize in
Economics;see Shultz (1961).The rise in this productivecapacity of
workers comes from two sources. Experience, som~times referred
to as the learning curve, enhances the rapidity and accuracy of
workers in completing assigned tasks. Formal training, both class-
room and on-the-job, increases the understanding and insight of
workers, which leads to rising facility and quality through better
methods and product innovation.
on nonhuman capital, table 2 shows that during 1948.—
85, capital-labor ratios (K/H) have at least doubled in
every sector of the U.S. economy except construction
and transportation, and that productivity (V/H) gener-
ally has grown faster in those sectors with faster capi-
tal growth (K/H).’ As with productivity, however,these
ratios have risen more slowly in services (1.7 percent
peryear) than in commodities (2.8percent peryear).’
While productivity growth has been slower overall
in services, it has resulted from neither a dearth of
investment nor intrinsically lower capital intensity of
services; indeed, as noted earlier, if one omits trans-
portation, capital grewmuch more rapidly in services
than in commodities production. As shown in table2,
capital-labor ratios have been consistently higher in
four of the seven service sectors than in manufactur-
ing, and the capital-labor ratios in the communica-
tions and wholesale categories were the fastest grow-
ingof all sectors. Moreover, in every industrial sector,
capitalhas grown more rapidlythan labor since1948.1~
In particular, the capital-labor ratio in other services
grew faster than that in manufacturing — 3.0 percent
vs. 2.8 percent — eventhough the other services share
of labor was rising while the manufacturing share of
‘The rank-order correlation between the 1948—85 sectoral growth
rates of Y/H and KJH in table 2 is .46; if transportation is omitted
(given the distortion in the capital-labor-output relations entailed in
theshift from railway toairline and trucking), the rank order correla-
tion is .53. Both correlation statistics are significant at the 5 percent
level.
‘Evaluating the impact of the increased capital input fully would
require a consideration of the quality of capital and technological
change. Also, the real price of a machine with given capacity may
have declined during the 1948—85 period; if so, the quantity of
capital would be understated. More important, technological ad-
vances occurred during this period, especially in computer-
controlled manufacturing processes. For example, numerical con-
trol and multi-axisomnimills have made possible themanufacture of
aircraft and rocket engines to tolerances not feasible at the begin-
ning of the period. These applications also have reduced the labor
input required in design and engineering processes through the
automation of drafting and modeling procedures. Proliferation of
these changes can be sampled by a glance at want-adsfor CAD/
CAMworkers — computer-aideddesign and computer-aidedmanu-
facturing. Moreover, the growth of capital-labor ratios is driven both
by capital growth and labor growth. As table 1 shows, the share of
both capital and labor have risen in services, while labor has fallen
and capital has risen in commodities, especially agriculture. Thus,
labor shifts may amplify or attenuate the accompanying capital
increases in termsof thecapital-labor ratios.
“Sincetheemployment share fell in manufacturing, it is possible that
the increases in capital-labor ratios, were due to falling employment
ratherthan risingcapital. Yet, astable 1 shows, theshareofprivate.
net U.S. nonresidential capital in manufacturing, like its share of
output, has remained relatively constant atabout 22 percent during
the postwar period. Thus, capital invested in manufacturing indus-
tries has grownapace with its output.
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There is substantive evidence that the postwar rise
in the share ofU.S. output in services reflects arelative
shiftin final demand for services and awayfrom com-
modities. Output of services has risen as a share of
total output (table 1); a rise in the relative price of
services, then, can only mean that the demand for
them also has increased relative to commodities. As
shown in table 3, the relative price of consumption
services measured in terms of the price of durable
goods has more than doubled since 1948.12 More gen-
erally, the lower half of the table indicates that the
relative price of all services (producers’ as well as
“As table 1 shows, except fortransportation and utilities, the service
subsectors’ capital shares all attain their maximums (denoted by
asterisks) at the most recent observation; in contrast, in the com-
modities sectors, the maximum capital share in each subsector
occurs considerably earlier.
‘2That is, construct a bundle of consumer durable goods (such as
televisions, electric mixers and bowling balls) and a bundle of
consumer services (such as dentist’s visits, movie tickets and auto-
mobile servicing) each costing $1,000 in 1982. Thus, by construc-
tion, the relative price ofthe services in termsof the durable goods
was 100 percent in 1982 prices. Comparing the same bundles in
1948,table 3 impliesthat the price of the service bundle was only 53
percent of the durable goods bundle, while in 1985 its relative price
was 116 percent.
Why has the demand forservices risen as a share of
output even though their prices relative to commodi-
ties have risen? One plausible answer is that the qual-
ity of services has risen, and the data, unadjusted for
the quality improvement, understate quantity and,
therefore, overstate price.13
Anotheranswer that has been advanced by develop-
ment economists and economic historians is that, as
economies mature) rising income is progressively di-
rected toward put-chases of “higher-order” or luxury
goods of which services predominate. Thus, Clark
(1951) found that:
‘~Serviceoutput is primarily measured in terms of inputs; thus, if
inputs, especially labor, increase in their productivity — e.g., physi-
cians or accountants and lawyers assisted by computer — their
hourlycharges will riseand, uncorrected for the quality rise, the unit
price will incorrectly be raised by the same amount. Such errors
would also lead to understated productivity growth in table 2. Man-
mont (1969), who provides a detailed description of the methods
and shortcomings of the U.S. Commerce Department’s accounting
procedures for services, eloquently encapsules this measurement
problem(p.16):
The industries that are the sub)ect of this paper do not make a pair of
shoes, a refrigerator, or a drill press; all ofwhich are tangible and can be
counted, althoughwith varying degrees of ambiguity. Instead, they pro-
vide services, that is, they safeguard savings, insure lives, lend money,
advertise businesses, audit books, restore health, repair cars, and so on.
Conceptual questions that are extremely difficult to answer are raised
when one attempts to count such units of output or measure changes in
their quality in order to provide a meaningful and consistent measure of
their contribution to total GNP.
laborwas falling. In summary, capital investment was
rapid in each service sector except transportation.”
Faster Demand Growth in Services
consumners’) measured in terms ofthe price of goods
has risen by about two-thirds since 1960.
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in the most advanced countries the demand for
manufactured goods tends to settle down finally at
about 20—25 percent ofthe national income. The de-
mand for farm products falls to 10 percent of national
income, andwill fall lower as income advances further.
rt follows that in the most advanced countries the
demand for services, including building and handi-
crafts and the products of small-scale manufacture,
will rise to 70 percent or more ofnational income.”
LONG-RUN TRENDS IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF OUTPUT AND
INPUT SHA14ES
The discussion of the U.S. postwar economy, the
data in tables 1—3, and the shaded insert on page 9
clearly establish five characteristics about the evolu-
tion of output and input shares:
• The shareofU.S. output in services has risen steadily
overthe entire 1948—85 period;
• Laborproductivity has grown faster inthe commod-
ities sector than in the services sector;
• The shift in output has reflected a relative shift in
consumer demand toward services;
• Labor and capital inputs have persistently risen in
services production;
• ‘the shift of labor into the services subsector of
“othei services” production has been primarily into
activities requiring specialized skills, not into un-
skilled activities.
These observations raise questions about the long-run
character of U.S. economic development:
• How long has the relative rise in service production
and employment been going on?
• Whathas happened to the distribution of U.S. labor
by occupation overlonger time periods?
• Are[he othermaiorindustrial economies experienc-
ing similar’ or parallel employment and output evo-
lutionaiy patterns?
Output and Labor Shares in the U.S.
Economy, 1800—1985
The main currents driving the evolution of U.S. out-
put and labor distribution since 1800 have been the
rising productivity of labor successively in agriculture
and manufacturing. Agriculture absorbed nearly
three-quarters ofthe labor’ forcein 1800 (persons aged
‘~Clark (1951), p.366. Clark first advanced thenotion of higher-order
goods (luxury goods) in the initial, 1940 edition of his book, which
argued that the service output share would rise with economic
development; he presented international and historic evidence to
support his assertions. See Beeson and Bryan (1986) for a discus-
sion of higher-order goods.
10 years and older, free and slave) with the residual
being poorly accounted for.” By 1840, agricultural em-
ployment still occupied between 60 and 70 percent of
American labor; however’, the share of employment in
manufacturing and construction had risen from 3
percent in 1810 to about 14 percent. In 1860, agricul-
ture’s share was still about 60 per’cent ofthe free labor
force compared with more than 18 percent in manu-
facturing and construction.” While pre-Civil Wardata
are not available for an analysis ofoutput by industry
in constant dollars, it has been estimated that in 1879
prices, the 1839 and 1859 agricultural shares of total
commodity output were 72 percent and 55 percent,
respectively, while manufacturing’s shares in the
same years were 17 percent and 32 percent.’7
More consistent data ar’e available on the distribu-
tion of output and labor for the period from 1870 to
1940. Unfortunately, the output data are for national
income in current prices, which distort the distribu-
tion of shares among sectors.” Nonetheless, with
these caveats, the data on national income and em-
ployment shares by industry for’ 1870—1940 are pre-
sented in table 4.
The most obvious char’acteristic of the data in table
4 is the steady rise in the proportion of the labor force
in service production over the 70-year period, along
with the concomitant decline in the proportion of
labor incommodity production. The proportion ofthe
labor foice in agriculture fell from one-half in 1870 to
about one-sixth in 1940. Although the manufacturing
share rose over this period, most of the labor’ released
from agriculture went to services production, whose
share roughly doubled. While the distribution of em-
ployment gains varies across the various service cate-
gories, every category’s share rises strongly.
“Lebergott (1964), tableA-i, p. 510.
“Lebergoti (1964), tableA-i and Fabnicant (1949), table 2, p. 42.
‘Table F-238-249, p. 239, U.S. HistoricalData Colonia/ Times to 1970.
“Gross National Product (GNP) less capital consumption allowance
(estimated depreciation) equals Net National Product (NNP). NNP
less indirect businesstaxes plus subsidies less current surplus from
government enterprises equals National Income (NI). NI isconven-
ientforsome analysesbecause it is equal to the sum of all payments
to factors of production — wages and salaries plus profits plus rent
plusinterest, Two distortions are introduced by taking shares of NI in
current dollarsrather than GNP in constant dollars: First, if produc-
tivity in agriculture and manufacturing grew faster than in other
sectors, the resulting decline in unitprices overthe 70 years in these
sectors will overstate their share in real terms in early years and
understate it in later years. Also, since national income omitsdepre-
ciation, indirect taxes and subsloles, the data also may distort the
shares relative to total value added on a real GNP basis. For an
illustration of how changes in the relative price of manufacturing
affects shares of real GNP, see table 3 in Perna (1986), p. 32.
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Chart 2
Share of Employment in U.S. Service Sector
1870—W85
Overall, the shift ofemployment from commodity to
services production hasbeen both persistent andrela-
tively steady. Anexamination of the data from 1880 to
1930 reveals that the share of employment in services
grew at an average annual rate of about 1.8 percent.”
Applying this 1880—1930 trend growth rate to the 1880
labor share and projecting it overthe succeeding 105
years, as cihart 2 does, fits the rising labor share rea-
sonably well. The predicted 1985 services labor force
“Bydefinition, the employment share in services must lie between 0
and 100 percent; consequently, a simple trend exponential growth
rate is not relevant in forecasting the share. A logisticgrowth curve,
5, [1 + exp {a + b (t-1880)]-’, meets the boundary constraints
and is easily fitto the data in table 4.The parameters (a “ 1.1527, b
= -.0184) were computed using the observed shares for 1880 and
1930; these years were used to avoid the labor market disruptions
following the Civil War and World War I and the distortions of the
1 930s.
share is 68.5 percent, while the actual labor share in
services production for 1985 (from table 1) is 71.9
percent. Apparently, the shift from commodities to
services has been proceeding fairly steadily for more
than a century.’°
The Distribution ofU.S. Labor By
Occupation, 1900—80
The analysis thus far has categorized output, labor
and capital by industrial sector. Yet, industrial firms in
commodities employ a widevariety ofsupport staffas
“Less can be said about the pattern of relative production since the
national income data are in current prices; however, there was
clearly a shift from agriculture to manufacturing within commodities
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well as industrial craftsmen, operatives arid labor —
including lawyers, nurses, accountants, gardeners,
and even cooks and laundry workers. Consequently,
any change in the amount of support work accom-
plished outside of the corporation by subcontracting
for services will change the distribution of employ-
ment even if the set of tasks being accomplished
overall is unchanged.”
On the othet- hand, the set of tasks to be accom-
plished in any production activity has evolved during
this century due to innovation and capital investment,
particularly investment in human capital.” For exam-
ple, inthe production ofmachine tools since1900, the
relative laborinputs ofengineers, designers, computer
operators and the like have risen relative to machin-
ists, other craftsmen and operatives. Thus, a more
complete picture of the distribution of the U.S. labor
force can be obtained by considering its occupational
as well as its industrial distribution. The occupational
breakdown of U.S. employment based on the U.S. de-
cennial censuses for 1900—80 isgiven in table 5.
Several features of the occupational distribution’s
evolution are clarified by the data in table 5 which
shows U.S. census percentage distribution of workers
by standard occupational categories.” First, as indi-
cated earlier, the share of employees in agricultural
occupations has declined precipitously — from 37.6
percent in 1900 to 2.8 percent in 1980 (the sum of
farmers and farm labor entries in table 5). Morestrik-
ing, however, is the rise in the share oftechnical and
managerial occupations and the decline ofunskilled
“That subcontractingof services is a key impetus in the rise ofservice
employment was emphasized by several experts testifying in the
congressional hearings on service industries. See U.S. Congress
(1984). For example, Kravis argued:
The other factor pushing up employment in the service industries is the
tendency of commodity-producing industries to contract out services
formerly performed in-house. .. .The advantages of employing outside
specialists increase as technology becomes more complicated — for
example, computerized accounting and — more capital intensive —
cleaning office buildings, catering employee meals: the hiring of in-house
[sicl lawyers to handle labor negotiations and tax matters.(p. 426)
“Thisimplies the increasing importanceof human capital in produc-
tion, which, in turn, hasbeen facilitated by a rise in the schooling of
the average American worker. In 1900, the average American
worker had completed7.7 years ofschooling; in 1957, schooling per
worker was 11.0 years and in 1984, it was 12.1 years. Moreover, the
school year, measured in average attendance pen pupil, has in-
creased by over 60 percent, from 99 days in 1900 to 159 days in
1957 to 162 days in 1970. See Shut (1971) and U.S. Department
of Commerce (1986), table No. 671, p.397.
“One tacitmeasure of rising U.S. welfare is the increase in the age at
which labor force entry is presumed to take place, from 10 years of
age in the 19th century to 14 years in the mid-2Oth century to 16
years in the late 20th century. In part, this reflects the increasing
investment in humancapital through formal schooling.
or unspecialized labor. In 1900, private household
workers plus farm plus nonfarm labor accounted for
35.6 percent ofemployment, while technical and man-
agerial occupations absorbed about 10.1 percent; in
1980, these low-skill labor categot-ies constituted only
6.6 percent of the labor force, while management and
technical occupations had increased to a 27.3 percent
share.” Although skilled manual trades — craftsmen,
foremen and operatives — made up a larger share of
thelaborforce in 1980 than theydid in 1900, this share
had declined markedly from its peak in 1950 — from
34.4 percent to 26.7 percent. Most of this decline was
in operatives, especially from 1970 to 1980; some may
reflect the upgrading in job skill requirements to pro-
fessional and technical, a category whose increase
occurred primarily during these three decades.
A more informative taxonomy is to divide the occu-
pational types into the following three categories:
information provision and decisionmaldng, direct
production, and non-information services. These
groupings, the subheadings in table 5, divide the cen-
sus categories according to the primary form ofoutput
generated by the worker. The first category encom-
passes the production of information by decisionma-
kers and all the supporting design, analysis and
record-keeping occupations and sales staff. The sec-
ond comprises labor directly involved in production
of goods and public utility services such as transport
and electricity. The third consists of services other
than information or utilities: private household ser-
vices, police and fix-c services, and food and cleaning
services. The evolution of labor shares within these
more inclusive categories isrendered inchart 3 for the
years 1900, 1950 and 1980.”
The data from table5, summarized in chart 3, show
that during this century the information anddecision-
making occupations have grown from about one-sixth
of all employment to well over half. Direct production
“Considering only nonagricultural employment (thatis excluding both
farm management and farm labor), the shareof unskilled labor fell
from 28.7 percent of U.S. nonfarm employment in 1900 to 5.2
percent in 1980. During these eight decades, management, techni-
cal and otherinformationoccupations rosefrom 28.2 percent to 54.5
percent of persons employed in nonfarm occupations.
“The informationcategory of employment was emphasized by sev-
eral witnesses in the Congressional hearings on Service Industries
[U.S. Congress (1984)], especially Levinson and Roach, pp. 261—
87. This taxonomy does not quite conform to the commodities/
services division used earlier since technical occupations include
both medical diagnosis and treatment, while operatives include
transportation and some other services such as occupations in
public utilities.
16FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JUNE/JULY 1987
~-\ ~ /,~+c \~~ ~. t
~~
~~iI~jLt~ 4 ~s~+ i ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~C<~
/ ‘~ ~ /c~ ~~ r ~ ~~ \ ~ ~ 4~’*t~- 4~~~/Ay ~
~~ ~ -~ ~~ \ > ~\ \ ~tte~ ~~
~ / /
~~IS /‘// N
N N ~ NN
N ~ P*~PtN
as ~
N \/t/~N NN~N~~ Nd NNk+N/NN ~N T~St~ ~C: ~




~ a-> :‘i~’~t d~N/~N / -:
/~N~N4_ /~ ~~N~NN/ N~s~~/ a N> / -,
N a-NaN -N <
/ >/~ / a N N
/A / >~> // N N
p ~><t N 5j~-N>//>~< N/~AS/NN
2 ;~ >~ +0#
a /5 NaN> a — /~Na~
s~.
N>~. ~ ~ 7jIIo~á11S
N ~- N Nd / pd. N/tN, ‘>N,> /N//t’/> \,///
labor, meanwhile, has fallen from about three-fourths
of employment to about one-third. The principal
source of the decline in production occupations has
been agriculture, whose share fell from 37.5 percent in
1900 to less than 3 percent in 1980. Nonagricultural
production occupations have a slightly lower share in
1980 than in 1900, but are well down from their maxi-
mum share of 41.1 percent attainedin 1950. The non-
information services share has increased slightly; in
fact, since 1940, its share has risen by 1.2 percentage
points with the decline in household services being
slightly more than offset by the rise in other services
primarily protection — fire, police and security).
The data from table 5 also can be used to illustrate
the relatively steadyevolution ofthe U.S. occupational
distribution in this century. A growth curve isfit to the
labor share in information provision/decisionmaking
occupations as it evolved during 1900—30. Projecting
the share of employment in this category can then be
used to determine if there have been abrupt shifts
during the 1930—80 period.” As chart 4 shows, the
projected share based on 1900—30 data fits the occu-
pational distribution quite well, growing at an annual
rate ofabout 2.2 percent: the predicted 1980 share is
55.9 percent1 compared with its actual share of 53.0
percent (table 5). A similar exercise for the direct
“Since the employment share in information provision!
decisionmaking must lie between 0 and 100 percent, a logistics
curve is appropriateto assess the trend; seefootnote 19. The fitted
logistics curve using the 1900 and 1930 shares (5,)from tableS is
5, = [1 + exp(1.544—0.022 (t-1900) ) 1’.
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Table 5 and charts 3 and 4 show that the lünctional
role of the typical American employee is progressively
moving away from the final mechanical step of com-
modities production — that is, fabrication assembly,
orpackaging.” Morethan 50 percent ofemployment is
now concentrated in analysis, design, managing and
recording processes, and sales, while, by inference,
U.S. capital (or foreign labor) is occupied to a larger
extent in mechanical production. Some observers de-
crythis as the initial symptom of industrial calamity:
The result is the evolution of anewkind of company:
manufacturers that do little or no manufacturing and
are increasingly becoming service-oriented, They may
perform a host of profit-making functions — from
designto distribution — but lacktheirown production
base. Incontrast to traditional manufacturers, they are
hollow corporations.”
“This notion — that innovation and investment make the production
process more roundabout or lengthen the period of production—is
the focus of a long-standing debate in economic theory. It is at the
core of the Austrian approach to capital theory; see ‘The Austrian
Theory ofCapital and Interest,’ chapter 12 in Blaug (1985).
“Business Week (1986), p. 57. Ironically, the same article positively
Yet this evolution simply reflects the operation of
the law of comparative advantage. As U.S. labor has
become more productive — due to increased human
and nonhuman capital — the opportunity cost of its
use in lower-valued stages of production has risen.
Those production processes in which capital cannot
sufficiently substitute for (or augment) labor must be
ceded to foreign lower-cost labor.” This view of labor
complements the conclusion of an analysis of the
performance and competitiveness of U.S. multina-
tional corporations by Lipsey and Kravis:
assesses several companies whose primary activities are product
research and development distribution with production done in
foreign countries due to high domestic labor costs: Nike Shoe
(German), Emerson Radio Corp. (U.S.), Pitney Bowes Inc. (U.S.)
and IBM (U.S.).
“The process works in reverse as well. Feder (1987) quotes Steven
Walleck, head of manufacturing consulting for McKinsey & Co. in
Cleveland, as claiming “majorshifts from labor intensive overseas
plants to the United Statesusually follow the design ofnew products
especially suited forautomated manufacturing and the introduction
ofnewmanufacturing systems.” An interesting example ofthis is the
recent agreement between Inland Steel (U.S.) and Nippon Steel
(Japan) for a joint venture, a cold-roll steel mill to be built in South
Bend, Indiana; see Kotlowitz (1987). This announcement followed
by less than threemonths theNippon Steel decision toclose 12 of its
steel mills in Japan; see Cullison (1987).
Chart 3
U.S. Employment Distribution by Occupation
1900—1980




Direct production Other services
Other service?”
1950
production labor share predicts a 1980 share of 37.4
percent compared with the observed 34.1 percent.
1980
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Chart 4




NOTE: Logistics curve based on percentage share of information services occupation employment 1900—1930; for
details, see footnote 26.
This record is consistent with the view that American
management and technology remained competitive,
and is atvariance with the argument sometimes made
that the fall in the share ofthe U.S. in world manufac-
tures exports was due to management failures and
declines in technology. Perhaps thegreater integration
of the world economy with respect to transport and
communications, and hence to the ease ofmanagerial
control’ over activities in distant locations, facilitated
the expansion ofaffiliate exports in the 1957—77 period,
but even so, American management should be cred-
itedwith taking advantage ofthese opportunities. And
since 1977, American-controlled firms abroad have
maintained their shares in a rapidly growing world
market, with powerful competition from Japan and
someother industrial countries and the adventofnew
competitors.”
“Lipsey and Kravis (1986), p. 24.
The Lipsey-Kravis hypothesis is consistent with the
persistent downward trend of the postwar share of
manufacturing employment. Yet, since the share of.
U.S. output in manufacturing has been constant over
this period, this trend does not imply the demise of
the manufacturing sector. Moreover, if the other in-
dustrial economieshaveexperienced similartrends in
employment and output shares, these trends can be




Throughout the 20th century, all advanced econo-
mies haveundergone parallel transformations in their
output and employment distributions. In each of the
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in agriculture have diminished greatly. For example,
as table 6 shows, the Japanese share of output in
agriculture was more than 54 percent in 1890 and the
corresponding employment share was 76 percent.
These shares were somewhat smaller for France and
the United States, and considerably smallei- for Ger-
manyand Great Britain. Over the succeeding 60 years,
in these countries agricultural activity declined, while
their goodsproduction sectors’ share rose.
From 1950 to 1984, while the specific patterns ofthe
production and output evolution vary somewhat, the
five industrial economies share three key features.
First, theproportion ofgoods production to real gross
domestic product (GDP) peaked between 1960 and
1970, and has fallen to less than 40 percent for each,
with the decline smallest for Japan.” Second, theshare
of employment in goods production, which also
peaked between 1960 and 1970, has declined for each
country from 1970 through 1984.”Third, by 1984, each
nation had similar output and employment shares in
services production.”
Some semblance of these long-term output and
labor shifts can beseen in the three developing econo-
mies included in table 6: Greece, Spain and Turkey.
Over the 1960—84 span, employment and output
shares declined most in agriculture; while these pro-
portions rose for both goods and service production,
the largest increases were in the service sectors. This
pattern resembles the shifts during 1870 —1940 in the
U.S. economy see table 4).
“GDP is GNP less net factor income from abroad.
“Once again, the Japanese decline is slight, but Japan began the
1 960s with by far the largest reservoir ofagricultural employment, a
reservoir that over the next 24 years declined by 21.3 percentage
points. This employment outflow contributeda large low-cost inflow
into manufacturing which the other industrial economies had long
since absorbed. This pattern issimilar to the decline in U.S. agricul-
tural employment during 1870—1940; see discussion above, p. 12
and table 4.
“This similarity probably will become even closer asJapan reduces
its inefficient share of agricultural labor. Declining Japanese agricul-
tural employment and protectionist inefficiencies were the topic of
recent reviews in the Wall Street Journal (Darlin (1986)) and The
Economist (1987). Also, the Bank of Japan was recently quoted
[Bank of International Settlement (1987)1 as describing its economy
in termsof duality, with relativelymore rapid expansion expected in
the service sector: “sluggish mining and industrial production, de-
clining business activity in the manufacturing sector” contrasting
with thefixed investment bynon-manufacturers: “which have bene-
fitted from the effects of the year’s appreciation and low oil prices,
are showing unexpected firmness, and they are limiting the deceler-
ation of the economy asa whole... With thesustainedincrease in the
non-manufacturing sector, the total number of employees will grow
modestly.”
CONCLUSION
The postwar rise of the U.S. economy’s service sec-
tor continues trends in output and employment that
reach back well over a century in U.S. history. The
employment shift has much to do with slower pro-
ductivity growth in services, the causes of which are
not well understood. This evolution is not unique to
the economy of the United States, but parallels
changes in other industrial nations and, to some ex-
tent, developing economies as well.
The x-ising share of output and employment in the
U.S. economy’s services sector is even more pro-
nounced when analyzed in terms of occupational
categories. Moreover, the capital distribution in the
United States also has been shifting toward service
production. These are not symptoms of impending
disaster for the U.S. economy. Rather, they are evi-
dence of itsefficient long-term evolution, propelled by
the relatively more rapid growth oflabor productivity
in commodities than in services. Clearly, this evolu-
tion enhances the economy’s capacity to provide ris-
ing standards of living for consumers and occupa-
tional satisfaction forworkers.
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